The Intercultural Shaping of the Intelligentsia's Representations of the World

as an appropriate approach for French and German foreign cultural policy in Russia

Abstract:

Relations between Russia and the European Union, in particular France and Germany, are currently in conflict, and much of this conflict is cultural. One may ask, however, can culture, as the 'third column of foreign policy' – as Willy Brandt said (Leonhardt 1969) – serve to secure a mutual partnership between the EU and Russia in a multipolar world?

The approach presented here of *intercultural shaping of the intelligentsia's representations of the world* is an appropriate one for French and German cultural foreign policy in Russia. It represents also the theoretical part of my PhD studies at Chemnitz University of Technology with Professor Stefan Garsztecki; at Zittau/Görlitz University of Applied Sciences with Professor Matthias Theodor Vogt; and at the University of Rouen–Normandie with Professor Philippe Lane.

Key Words

- Cultural Diplomacy

- Russia

- Intelligentsia

- Intercultural

- Soft Power

Special thanks

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Contents

1.   Introduction

Relations between Russia and the European Union, in particular France and Germany, are currently conflictual. It cannot improve with military threats or economic sanctions. Indeed, the nature of this conflict is cultural, because of different values. (Bret, Parmentier 2016 pp. 9-10). However, can culture as 'the third column of foreign policy' – as Willy Brandt said (Leonhardt 1969) – serve to secure a mutual partnership between the EU and Russia in a multipolar world?

The approach presented here of *intercultural shaping of the intelligentsia's representations of the world* is an appropriate one for French and German cultural foreign policy in Russia. It represents the theoretical part of my PhD study 'Modelage interculturel des représentations du monde de l'intelligentsia: répercussions des institutions culturelles allemandes et françaises en Russie'[1] at Chemnitz University of Technology with Professor Stefan Garsztecki; at Zittau/Görlitz University of Applied Sciences with Professor Matthias Theodor Vogt; and at the University of Rouen–Normandie with Professor Philippe Lane.

For my research, I borrow the term '*shaping of representations of the world*' from Matthias Theodor Vogt's idea of *Modellierung der Vorstellungswelten (Vogt et al. 2016 p. 61)* and extend it with 1: the notion of power as shaping, 2: the idea of reciprocity contained in the intercultural concept, and 3: the case of the Russian intelligentsia.

This article is committed to the definition of each notion of the approach that I begin to elaborate for my PhD. This research paper is structured as follows:

  a. the notion of *shaping* as the aim of power
  b. the necessity of reciprocity contained in the word *intercultural.*
  c. to illustrate the concept of *representations of the world* and describe their shaping.
  d. to define the *Russian intelligentsia* and why it is necessary for the approach presented here.
  e. to *summarize* the approach.

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[1] The intercultural shaping of the intelligentsia's representations of the world: impacts of French and German cultural institutions in Russia.

2.   What does shaping mean?

The etymology of 'power' leads us to the meaning 'to knead something' in the sense of 'to shape something'.[2] Thus, in this approach, I will define power as *shaping*.

2.1.   *Object* and *aim* of shaping power

Power must be distinguished between 1a: the capacity to do something by yourself and 1b: the possibility that someone does what you want, as well as 2a: its relational sense ('pouvoir' in French) and 2b: its institutional sense ('Pouvoir' in French)[3]. This analysis of power is focused on 1b and 2a.

Analogous to Clausewitz in his book on war (Clausewitz 2012 [1st ed. 1834]), it is also necessary to distinguish 1: the *object* (der Zweck): what we want to attain with power, 2: the *aim* (das Ziel): what we want to attain in a power relationship, and 3: the *means* (das Mittel) of power: which strategy we will use to attain the object. The German sociologist Max Weber described at the beginning of the twentieth century that the *object* of power is 'ever chance (no matter where on this chance is based) that in a social relationship someone can impose his own will, also against resistance'.[4] In Robert Dahl's definition of power, which is similar to Max Weber's, the *object* of power is that A can obtain, that B does something he would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957 pp. 202-203).

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[2] The Proto-Indo-European root of power is *potis (Latin: possum form potis sum: to be <u>able</u>, to have influence), which means 'master', 'host', 'owner' in the sense of 'to possess' (Pokorny 1994) and 'self' (Derksen 2015). The word 'able', from Latin *habilis,* which comes from the verb *habeo* in the sense of 'hold in hand' (Andrews, Lewis 1987), has to be brought with the word 'manipulate' closer: 'manipulare' (Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales 2018) in old French means 'to conduct by hand' and in Latin 'hand full' (manus-plenus). The word 'power' has a link with the hand in a passive (to possess) and an active way (manipulare). The German (Macht) and Russian (Мощь) word for power as well as the word 'might' in English come from another root: *maĝh- (to be able, to help, power), near to *maĝ- (to knead): the hand kneads some soft material, like clay, to shape some objet, like pots. Thus, 'might' or 'power' mean 'knead' in the sense of 'shaping' but can be applied for things other than the fabrication of objects. (Gerhardt 1996 p.34).

[3] Braud 1982 p. 10. I will explain later, that the institutional sense of power is what Max Weber means with *Herrschaft.*

[4] 'Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer soziale Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht.' Weber 2015 [1st ed. 1922], p. 28.

However, this research paper is focused on the *aim* and *means* of power. In his theory of disciplinary power, Michel Foucault asserts that the *subject*[5] would be *shaped* by power. Unlike Dahl, Michel Foucault describes a long-term power that is not based on punctual action: if A can achieve that B does his bidding once, does B forever do what A wants? This idea of power, like Steven Lukes' theory of the radical view of power, is based on the securing of voluntary compliance of A over B (Lukes 2005 [1st ed. 1974] p.99). The *aim* of power is consequently to *shape* the preferences of B to secure that he would always do what A wants, insofar as B has appropriated A's will as his own.

In his book 'What is power?', Byuung-Chul Han defends the thesis, that the *aim* of power is to be yourself with the other (*bei dem anderen sich selbst zu sein* - Han 2005 p.70). This concept of power does not lead to the eternal domination of A over B, but implies that A and B have the same aspirations in life and the same representations of the world. Thus, it means sharing your will. For example, in the Bible the Almighty God *shaped* Adam with clay in his image so that he accomplishes God's will on earth (GEN 1:26; GEN 2:7).[6] In this approach, what I mean with shaping is this *aim* of power.

2.2.   The *soft* nature of shaping power

This idea of power, which I call 'shaping power' or only 'shaping', is an alternative to the concept of *Soft Power* of Joseph Nye. An ancient Chinese stratagem illustrates his idea already at this end of the sixth century:

> To use soft and gentle means to overcome the hard and strong (以柔克刚 yi rou ke gang); and drips of water can penetrate a stone (滴水穿石 di shui chuan shi). (Sun Tzu (544-496BC) cited in Fan 2008, p. 3)

So when Joseph Nye develops the term of soft power in the 1990s he has invented nothing new. In his theory, Joseph Nye opposed soft power with *hard power*:

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[5] 'There are two meanings of the word 'subject': subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to.' Foucault 1982 p. 781.

[6] The same tradition exists in ancient Egypt with the God Khnumu, which means 'to knead' (Maspero 1895) and in ancient Greece with Prometheus. Both gods shaped humans by kneading clay. This idea exists also in the Quran: 3,59; 23,12; 37,11; 38,71-72.

"This aspect of power – That is, <u>getting others to want, what you want</u> – might be called indirect or co-optive power behavior. It is in contrast to the active command power of getting others to do what you want." (Nye, Jr. 1990a, p. 31).

But he confuses *aim* and *object* of power. Both aims (of 'command power and of 'co-optive power'[7]) are included in the same strategy: the aim of soft power is to get the other to want, what you want, but its *object* is that the other will do what you want. However, it is not clear what the political scientist means with 'what you want': does he mean voluntary compliance or about the same aspirations? Thus, soft power does not describe another 'face' of power but describes its *aim*.

However, it seems to me that the nature of power is always *soft* and never *hard* (the 'command power' refers to the phenomenon of *Herrschaft*[8]) because it precedes structures. Carl Schmitt uses the term *Vorraum der Macht* (anteroom of power) to describe the powerfulness of Frederick the Great's valet who became the privileged contact person of the Prussian king (Schmitt 2008 [1st ed. 1954] p.22-23): this example does not show an 'anteroom of power[9]' but that the power gets over the hierarchical structure, viz. over the *Herrschaft*.

The earlier mentioned Chinese stratagem illustrates the primacy of the power, which is soft (drips of water), over the *Herrschaft*, which is hard (stone).

3.   Why intercultural?

The presented research takes place not only in international relations, which means relations between the governments of states (in this case, the French, German and Russian governments); it takes place also in intercultural relations viz. in relations between cultures and its promoters (in this case, the French and German creative class and the Russian intelligentsia – see below). It is the first reason, why I use here the term "*intercultural*".

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[7] The American political scientist opposed the notions of 'hard power' and 'soft power' later in an article in Foreign Policy Nye, Jr. 1990b.

[8] '*Herrschaft* soll heißen die Chance, für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen, Gehorsam zu finden' Weber 2015 [1st ed. 1922] p.28/ '*Herrschaft*' is the probalitity that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.' Translation in Weber et al. 1978 p. 53.

[9] In French *faire antichambre* (like in German *antichambrieren*) means to wait in the anteroom but also to try to impose your will to the public officials. In English we use the term of *lobby* which means the same.

The other reason that I use this term is to criticize and re-think the Nye's concept of soft power that I mentioned earlier. Its lack seems to me to be its unilaterality. Applied to the idea of the shaping power, shaping in a unilateral way may be likened to building a *semipermeable membrane* between cultures A and B. Analogous to the biological one, this kind of membrane will allow some elements of culture A to pass through it to culture B, but it will not allow elements of culture B to pass back through it into its own culture.

Illustration 1
A semipermeable membrane

But it is an illusion to think that there could be a one-directional exchange during contact between two cultures. With the introduction of the term of orientalism, Edward Said pointed out that colonialism has coined not only the colonized but also the colonizer (Said 1994 [1st ed. 1978]). This example shows the idea, that there is always a *feedback* by using shaping power.

If the aim of shaping power is to be yourself with the other, the idea of *interculturality* in the presented approach is the *reciprocity of hospitality* (Vogt 2017), viz. that the other can be also himself with you. Indeed, the earlier mentioned *feedback* is a positive one, if it is voluntary accepted and encouraged. It participates to a "mutual benefit [for] all the nations, [which] practicing it [cultural co-operation]"[10]

In the case of my research, I must take the first step in the intercultural process: I need to become imbued with Russian culture and recognize its specificities. One of them, the intelligentsia, will be studied in the fifth part of the research paper.

4. What are the representations of the world?

Arthur Schopenhauer declared 'Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung' (the world is my representation - Schopenhauer 1977 [1st ed. 1819], translation in Schopenhauer 1969). Indeed, the world is, for an individual, the known part of an unknown universe (Clavier 1995). The repre-

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[10] 'Cultural co-operation shall be carried on for the mutual benefit of all the nations practicing it. Exchanges to which it gives rise shall be arranged in a spirit of broad reciprocity.' United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) article VIII, Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation 1966.
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13147&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

sentations of the world are to an individual what can be explained of the small part known of an absolute unknown.

The American essayist Seth Lachterman translated Schopenhauer's main work as World as Will and Presentation, because he interpreted the Schopenhauer's idea of *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' of objects in the *theater of our own mind*.[11] However, the principle of Hegel's *Verinnerlichung*[12] (internalization) asserts that the first play in theater – if I can still use this metaphor – takes place not in our mind but in front of our eyes. After that, from Hegel's point of view, we internalize it. This spatial meaning exists namely in the term presentation. But after the first play, we play it in our own mind once again, so we <u>re</u>present the play. This idea points out a dynamic process between the object and the subject: the object is presented to the subject and the subject internalizes the object and represents it in his own mind. That why I prefer to use the word *representation*.

A similar concept, the *Weltanschauung,* does not explain the dynamic process, which is contained in *representations of the world*, because it is a one-directional view (in German *anschauen* means 'look at something'), which comes from the subject to the object.

The notion of 'representations of the world' is a translation of the German word "Vorstellungswelten", which are from Vogt's point of view:

> „Gemeint sind die Bilder im Kopf, die handlungsleitend werden. Sie veranlassen Menschen, etwas zu tun oder zu lassen." (Vogt et al. 2015, p. 9) / 'What is meant are the images in the mind that guide actions. They cause people to do something or not to do it.'(Translation – Adrien Houguet).

Near to the spatial (as presentation) and the temporal (as representation), the word *Vorstellung* has a 'potential' sense (as <u>imag</u>ination). The prefix *Vor* means not only "in front of", but it means also "before". Still using the metaphor of theatre, a play can be imagined in our own mind before it will be <u>potentially</u> played. Thus, the representations of the world are not only explanations of the world but also models of behavior for future actions. These models are shaped by power, as Foucault says:

> « Pouvoir et savoir s'impliquent directement l'un l'autre […] il n'y a pas de relation de pouvoir sans constitution corrélative d'un champ de savoir, ni de savoir qui ne suppose et ne constitue en même temps des rela-

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[11] Lachterman, 2009, cited in Vogt et al. 2016 pp. 72-73.
[12] Hegel *Enzyklopödie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, in: Werke, Bd.10, S.11 cited in Han 2005 p.71

tions de pouvoir. » (Foucault 1993 [1st ed. 1975], p. 32) / Power and knowledge directly imply one another […] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time a power relation. (translation in Digeser 1992 p.986)

The representations of the world are what Foucault means with *fields of knowledge*[13]. They are immanent to power relations: their shaping goes hand in hand with power.

4.1. How are the representations of the world shaped?

It seems to me, that there is a transition of technological powers between the classic age, that Foucault studied, and nowadays. I will explain short it in this part. In the Foucauldian theory of disciplinary power during the classic age, three mechanisms are employed to shape the subject: 1: *la surveillance hierarchique* (hierarchical observation), 2: *la sanction normalisatrice* (normalizing judgment) and 3: *l'examen* (examination). (Foucault 1993 [1st ed. 1975])

In western societies, the disciplinary institutions (e.g., schools, the army, prisons and hospitals) are in crisis (Foucault 2017 [1st ed. 1978] pp.142-147). They failed for two reasons: 1: economic, because the costs of these institutions are higher and they are not sufficient for the whole population, and 2: sociological, the (western) societies are changing, and their individual members too; they became more diversified and independent.

Based on the theories of Foucault and my own observations I think that a new type of technological power has been developed since the Foucauldian foundations. Though it existed before, it was not in this extent. In this technological power, the three mechanisms that Foucault stated in his theory are exerted by individuals over themselves. *Self-surveillance*, *self-judgment* and *self-examination* are consequences of a new mechanism that works upstream.

In fact, images (I mean here not only pictures, but also all possibilities of transmitting to another an idea, like a book, a sound, a movie etc.) are used as models to shape the representations of the world of each individual. Similar to Dawkins' concept of meme (Dawkins 2016 [1st ed. 1976]), these models will be assimilated by imitation. Through their shaped representations of the world (which are models), individuals will act on their own to follow them.

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[13] « Le savoir dans le vocabulaire foucaldien désigne le mouvement de subjectivation qui aboutit à une modification plus ou moins considérable dans le sujet connaissant » Vihalem 2011, p. 91 / 'the knowledge, in the Foucauldian vocabulary, designate the process of subjectification that results to a more or less important modification in knowing subject.' (Translation – Adrien Houguet).

4.2.   The *creative class* as the main producer of representations of the world

This idea of technological power can be so summarized: new models, in form of images, shape existing models by imitation. But who creates these new models? Vogt explain that these images are artistic production:

> „Vorstellungswelten werden insbesondere durch künstlerische Fassung produziert oder verän-dert"/representations of the world are produced or changed in particular by artistic productions (Translation – Adrien Houguet) (Vogt et al. 2015, p. 9)

The *creative class* (consisting of the workers of the sectors of knowledge, education, culture, arts and business management - Florida 2002 p.8) in western societies is namely the main producer of images, in the form of *artistic productions*. By influencing this class, it is possible to change the images that they produce viz. to change the representations of the world of the whole society. In fact, the representations of the world of the *creative class* could be shaped or modify during an intercultural exchange with a *creative class* of another society.

Which aim follows the creative class? Does it produce images, in which it barely does not believe, to secure its or government's voluntary compliance over the population (Lukes' and Foucault's concept of power)? Or it aim is *shaping* viz. to share its own will with the population (Han's and Houguet's concept of power)? In the western societies, the government has almost ceded the shaping of the population's representation of the world to an institutional-ized creative class. What is about Russian society? I will now introduce the term of *intelli-gentsia*.

5.   What is intelligentsia?

The intelligentsia is specific to Russia. It has not the same nature as in the creative class in the western societies. It emerged during the 19th century as a group of well-educated people with different visions for Russia's development. It was not an institutionalized group and was not defined by professions, in which there were, for example, professors, writers, artists etc. The member of the intelligentsia were linked by ideology viz. by their representations of the world (Berdiaev 2016 [1st ed. 1932 in German]).

Through the contact with the western cultures, which began with the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725), and the import of enlightenment from Europa with Voltaire und Diderot under Catherine the Great (1768-1796) began an emulation in the Russian intellectual life. After the missed Decembrist revolt in 1825, which was based on the ideas of the French Revolution, the

Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) oppressed the intelligentsia. In a small circle of noblemen, with no political role, members of the intelligentsia of the 1830s and 1840s fought among themselves of their ideas in private salons. It was emerged out of two movements of ideas: the Westernizer (Западничество), which wanted to take the European way of modernization, and the Slavophilia (Славянофильство), which saw in the Russian national character (народность) a unique way for Russia's development. In fact, there were two sub-groups in the Westernizer: socialists and liberals. Although they had two different *representations of the world,* members of the intelligentsia were against the serfdom in Russia. This was abolished during the 1860s under Alexander II (1855-1881). It emerged a new type of intelligentsia during the 1860s and 1870s: a revolutionary one. This group was preparing the [socialist] revolution, which beaked out in 1905 and in 1917.

Near to the intelligentsia, which 'understood its role as the engine of 'real' Russian progress' (Barnes 2015), the Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) developed an official ideology for Russia. It was based on the triad "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and National Character (народность)". At this moment began a concurrence between two forces to shape the representations of the world of the Russian people: the rulers and the intelligentsia (Barnes 2015 p.80). To ensure the application of the new ideology the Tsar called some intellectuals, who wanted to collaborate with the government. They accepted to collaborate because of recompenses or fear (Narvselius 2012 pp.87-141). This was the birth of a 'pseudo-intelligentsia' near to the 'true intelligentsia'. The first group produced images (see above) to secure the voluntary compliance of the government over the population, the second group wanted to shape the population's representations of the world to share with them its own aspirations.

Before the Russian Revolution, the intelligentsia was composed of members from different classes. Paradoxical, from Berdyaev's point of view, the intelligentsia was a replacement to bourgeoisie in the domain of ideas (Berdiaev 2016 [1st ed. 1932 in German]). In 1917, the Bolshevik's will of elimination of bourgeois elements in the Russian society leaded to perception of the old intelligentsia (pseudo and true) under the tsarist regime as an enemy class. In reality, they created a new pseudo-intelligentsia, as 'пролетарии умственного труда' (proletarians of mental labor), under the control of the communist party. This one was an institutionalized class, defined by professions. The regime used recompenses or fear to its compliance. The Stalin's purges affected members of the old intelligentsia but their ideas survived. Indeed, the same constellation of pseudo and true intelligentsia still existed during the Soviet

Union and the true intelligentsia was still not institutionalized, not linked by professions but by ideology.

During the soviet era, a third major movement of ideas emerged in the intelligentsia: *Eurasianism* (Евразийство). Its members observed the unique geopolitical position of Russia between Asia and Europe. According to them, Russian culture is an intercultural product of Occident and Orient.

With the Gorbatchev's *Perestroika* in 1985, the true intelligentsia reemerged as a replacement to bourgeoisie in the domain of ideas supporting liberal ideas and/or nationalism. Its member supported Gorbatchev and, due to their radicalization, they supported Yeltsin (Lemoine 2005). But this kind of intelligentsia was not the bourgeoisie, neither at the political level nor at the economic level, so when the Soviet Union collapsed, did they starve. In fact, the true intelligentsia survived due to a doublespeak (Barnes 2015 p.83) inside the soviet institutions. After the collapse there were no institutions and no money to pay neither the true nor the pseudo-intelligentsia.

In the post-soviet Russia a new 'pseudo-intelligentsia' is making resurgence while the true intelligentsia fights for its survival:

> 'The intelligentsia were co-opted by the post-soviet Russian government much as they were in the soviet union. Even the word has lost its social value today as a different class of social elites is increasingly promoted in media and political circles. Some groups still remain true to the traditional intelligentsia, but the y are the few who keep this important Russian social class alive.' (Barnes 2015 p.79)

5.1. What can the French and German institutions do in the Russian intelligentsia-government constellation?

The main problem in the Russia's intelligentsia-government constellation is that the Russian government does listen neither to the true intelligentsia, that it oppresses, nor to the pseudo-intelligentsia, that it controls. It did not cede to an independent intelligentsia the role of shaping the representations of the world of the Russian people[14].

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[14] A Russian model of governance, a unique one in the world, could be inspired by Platoon's republic, in which there is a rule of philosophers (in this case as indirect rule): an independent intelligentsia, which listen the population, could work together with the government, which listen its propositions.

So, what can the French and German institutions do in the Russian intelligentsia-government constellation? They have to follow two aims: 1) they have to support the true intelligentsia's ideas and 2) they have to be a mediator between the true intelligentsia and the Russian government. They can do that in trying to make events, which link the Russian government and the intelligentsia.

The French and German cultural institutions need to interact with all of the intelligentsia's sub-groups: with its liberal members to let germinate their representations of the world in Russia and with the other groups to receive the Russia's representations of the world.

6. Summary

I thus summarize the approach of *intercultural shaping of the intelligentsia's representations of the world*.

- Power means 'shaping' and its aim is to be yourself with the other, so that the other has the same representations of the world as you have.
- Intercultural means the contrary of shaping: the idea is that the other can be himself/herself with you.
- The representations of the world are explanations of the world and models of behavior for future actions. They are shaped with images, which are produced by the *creative class* in the western societies and by the *intelligentsia* in Russia.
- The intelligentsia is specific to Russia. It is split in three major representations of the world: 1) Westernizer, which has two sub-groups: socialists and liberal, 2) Slavophila and 3) Eurasianism. There is a 1) pseudo-intelligentsia, which collaborates which the government and follows its ideology, and a 2) true intelligentsia, which is independent but weak and not listened.

The French and German cultural institutions in Russia, which are pillars of the cultural foreign policy of France and Germany, have to follow two aims: 1) they have to lead a dialog with all intelligentsia's sub-groups to make an *intercultural shaping of the relation of the world* between the French and German creative class and the Russian intelligentsia. 2) They have to act as mediator between the true intelligentsia and the Russian government, so that they can listen each other.

In the context of my PhD, a second step will be to advance this approach through empirical research on the impact of the French and German cultural institutions on Russian society and revise it with the obtained results. This will begin after the submission of the theoretical part of my PhD.

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